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Fifty years ago today, three American astronauts died in a sudden, uncontrollable cabin burn down aboard the Apollo I space capsule. The deaths of Virgil "Gus" Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee could have spelled doom for the entire Apollo space program, particularly after a report surfaced showing NASA had been enlightened of bug and deficiencies in the piece of work performed by N American Aviation, the contractor in-charge of edifice the Apollo 1 capsule. The loss of Apollo I's crew ultimately didn't lead to the cancellation of the space program, only it did drive significant changes to NASA's testing methodologies and best practices, some of which endure to this day.

Equally-204 was supposed to be the outset manned flying test of the Apollo Command/Service Module (CSM). The goal was to proceed the module in-orbit for as long equally 14 days for a full evaluation of the spacecraft'southward diverse capabilities. The Apollo I CSM was vastly more complex than any other spacecraft the Us had previously built, and NASA's chosen contractor made several decisions that directly led to the burn and loss of Apollo I's coiffure. Every bit Ars Technica notes, N American had used machines to bundle wires into the spacecraft, with a number of frayed wires and potential short-circuits. Spacecraft 012 (as it was then known) had shipped to Florida with more than 100 "significant" technology issues. The astronauts themselves may have been wary of complaining also loudly about bug with the sheathing, lest they be pulled off the flight. NASA has been described as being gripped with "Go Fever," during this time — think "launch, baby, launch as opposed to "drill, baby, drill."

A1prayer

The Apollo I coiffure presented this photo to Joe Shea, Apollo Spacecraft Program Office Managing director, on August nineteen, 1966. The explanation reads "It isn't that we don't trust you, Joe, simply this fourth dimension we've decided to go over your head."

NASA had been moving at a rapid prune. The first manned Mercury flight was in 1961, and while President Kennedy commissioned Apollo as a follow-up to Mercury, a new intermediate program was needed (Gemini). By 1967, NASA had built iii distinct new spacecraft — Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo, with the Apollo I capsule under construction earlier the offset manned Gemini flying.

NASA_spacecraft_comparison

A size comparison of the 3 NASA spacecraft and their launch vehicles.

As Ars notes, in the 50 years since Apollo I, NASA has fielded only one new crewed spacecraft — the Infinite Shuttle. (To be off-white, this says more about shifting Presidential priorities and a full general lack of emphasis on the infinite program, postal service-Apollo, than it does nearly NASA.)

The Apollo I disaster

The launch simulation on Jan 27, 1967, was a "plugs-out" test designed to measure how the spacecraft would operate on imitation internal power, with no back up from cables or umbilicals. Neither the spacecraft nor the rocket was fueled and all pyrotechnic systems were disabled.

In social club to cut costs and trim mission weight, NASA had decided to use a pure-oxygen environment within the Apollo I capsule. This wasn't seen equally a problem, since Gemini and Mercury had both used a similar system, and it saved weight compared with a more complex nitrogen-oxygen system. Grissom, Chaffee, and White entered the spacecraft at 1 PM, expecting the exam to take just a few hours. The internal cabin was pressurized to 16.7 psi, higher than the external pressure of 14.7 PSI. The Apollo I door hatch consisted of a removable inner hatch, a hinged outer hatch, and an outer hatch comprehend. Critically, the hatch could non be opened while the cabin was at a college force per unit area than the exterior surroundings, and it took 90 seconds to open up in the best of circumstances.

AS-204_-_hatch

The original As-204 hatch pattern couldn't be opened when the cabin was pressurized.

At 6:31:04.seven, Grissom (we retrieve) exclaimed "Hey!" or "Fire!" A few seconds later, a partially indistinct voice shouts something along the lines of "We've got a bad fire, open her up," followed by a cry of pain. In that location would exist no further communication with the iii astronauts. The fire drove the internal cabin force per unit area equally high as 29 psi, well above its maximum rating. The module ruptured at half-dozen:31:xix, sending a curtain of flame across the module, from left to right. Thick black smoke and toxic fumes poured across the pad service structure. NASA didn't have the proper equipment on-hand to deal with a problem of this magnitude, and the explosive rupture and thick smoke convinced some NASA techs convinced the entire command module was about to explode. It took rescue crews 5 minutes, 30 seconds to open the Apollo I module. Initial atmospheric condition inside the crew module were and then thick with smoke, despite the lights nonetheless being on, that the NASA rescuers were unable to find the bodies of the coiffure.

After assay showed the senior airplane pilot, Ed White, had probable attempted to open up the hatch but had been unable to do so. The fire burned incredibly hot — an image of the space suits recovered from the incident tin be seen here. Fair warning — it isn't pretty.

Apollo_1's_Command_Module_-_GPN-2003-00057

The command module, postal service-burn down.

The burn is believed to have begun in the lower forward portion of the left equipment bay, and may have been initially slowed by a lack of combustible material and the aluminum skin of the spacecraft itself, which would accept acted every bit a heat sink. Debris traps across the tiptop of cabin, made from woven nylon, proved exquisitely combustible, and as the nylon burned through, it scattered throughout the motel, spreading further. The NASA written report states that by six:31:12 "A wall of flames extended along the left wall of the module, preventing the control pilot, occupying the left couch, from reaching the valve that would vent the command module to the exterior atmosphere."

The stages of this particular fire were incredibly fast. Phase I lasted 15 seconds later Grissom's weep. Stage II began at 6:31:xix and ended 6 seconds later, with the module engulfed in flame. With the cabin's internal oxygen depleted, heavy smoke formed and huge amounts of soot were deposited on all command surfaces and the remains of the astronauts themselves. By 6:31:30, the atmosphere within the capsule is believed to have been lethal. Full time elapsed: 26 seconds.

Backwash

The Apollo program'south manned mission development was put on a 20-month hiatus while the incident was investigated. Meaning changes to the Apollo program were made as a consequence — changes that dramatically improved the safety and reliability of the Apollo CSM, and that many accept credited with helping NASA reach the moon at all. Rules were inverse to allow engineers and astronauts to accept suggestions dorsum to North American Aviation, and Due north American was required to permit detailed inspections. The new, Block II CSM was substantially redesigned and a new quick-release hatch mechanism was implemented.

Three days after the accident, Flying Director Gene Kranz gave a speech to Mission Control which has since become legend.

Spaceflight volition never tolerate carelessness, incapacity, and fail. Somewhere, somehow, we screwed up. It could accept been in design, build, or test. Whatever it was, we should have caught it. We were also gung ho nearly the schedule and we locked out all of the problems nosotros saw each day in our work. Every element of the program was in trouble and so were we. The simulators were non working, Mission Command was behind in virtually every area, and the flight and test procedures changed daily. Aught we did had any shelf life. Not one of us stood upward and said, "Dammit, stop!" I don't know what Thompson's committee will find every bit the cause, but I know what I discover. We are the cause! We were non ready! We did non do our chore. We were rolling the dice, hoping that things would come together by launch day, when in our hearts we knew it would have a miracle. We were pushing the schedule and betting that the Cape would skid earlier we did.

From this day forward, Flight Control volition be known past two words: "Tough" and "Competent." Tough means we are forever accountable for what we do or what we fail to practise. We will never again compromise our responsibilities. Every time we walk into Mission Command nosotros will know what we correspond. Competent means we will never accept anything for granted. We will never be constitute short in our noesis and in our skills. Mission Command volition exist perfect. When y'all get out this meeting today y'all volition go to your office and the commencement matter y'all will do there is to write "Tough and Competent" on your blackboards. It will never be erased. Each day when you enter the room these words will remind y'all of the toll paid by Grissom, White, and Chaffee. These words are the toll of admission to the ranks of Mission Command.

Today, NASA unveiled a new exhibit dedicated to the crew of the Apollo I. Titled Ad Astra Per Aspera — A rough route leads to the stars — information technology includes the 3 hatches of Apollo I, now on brandish for the first time ever.

Feature image by Collectspace